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ABSTRACT:In this paper a market model for optometric services is es-
timated across states, using data for the mid-i 960s.Several of the hy-
potheses that have been offered to explain thedemand for and supply of
physician services are also relevant to the marketfor optometric services
and are re-examined in this research. In thediscussion of the empirical re-
sults, emphasis is placed on the differences betweenurban and rural areas
in the per capita supply of optometricservices. The results indicate that
because of a combination of lowermarket prices in rural areas and a
backward-bending labor supply curve, the relativescarcity in the supply
of optometric services in rural areas is notnearly as great as the relative
scarcity of optometrists.
My purpose here is to analyze the market for
optometric services in theUnited
States. Although gross expenditures for thoseservices are only a small partof
total health care expenditures1 those without a
specialized interest in eye care
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may also be concerned with the findings here because many of thu hypoth
eses offered to explain the workings of the market for physician servicesare
also relevant to the delivery of optometric services and arere-examined in this
research. Some of the questions considered within the framework ofthe fliodel
for optometric services developed in this paper are:What factorsinfluence
the locational decision of the optometrist? What effect doesadvertising have
on the demand for optometric Services? To what extent is theinterstate
mobility of optometrists inhibited by restrictive licensingarrangements? What
role do price and income play in determining the demand foroptometric ser-
vices? What is the influence of price on the workloads ofoptometrists
This paper is divided into five sections. In the first three,a market model for
optometric services is specified and discussed. Estimates of themodel arepre-
sented in section 4, and the implications of this researchare considered in sec-
tion 5.
El] SPECIFICAIf ON OF THE MODEL
A fully specified model of the market foroptometric services must describe
both the demand for and supply ofoptometric services. The modelestimated
in this study consists of an identity,a demand equation, and twoequations
which together describe the supplyof optometric services.2 Thesupply side is
investigated by examining the workloadand locational decisions ofthe op-
tometrist. The four endogenous variablesin the model (marked byasterisks) are per capita quantity of optometricservices demanded price,per capita
number of optometrists, andthe workload of theoptometrist The model is presented below:
QdQd (P, Y, Age. NW Ed, Advert, Oph.Opi
Opto = Opto (P, License,V. Grads)
Work = Work (p*)
( QOptoWork
where
Qd = quantity of optometricservices demandedper 100,000 population Pprice
Vper capita income
Age = percent of thepopulation 65 andover
NW = percent of thepopulation nonwhite
Ed = percent of thepopulation with one to threeyears of college Oph = ophthalmologistsper 100,000 population
Opti = opticiansper 100,000 population
Opto = optonietristsper 100,000 population
/Advert = advertising restriction dummy: 1 = no state restrictions on advertising
License = national hoard licensing durnm': 1 = national boards not accepted
Gradsnumber of 1968 graduates of optometry schools
Work = average annual output supplied by Optometrists
(2] THE DATA
The model is estimated across states. Data limitations require that sources for
the mid-i 960s be combined. The qdantity measure of the per capita consump-
tion of optometric services by state is calculated by multiplying the annual
average output of optometrists in each state by the number of practicing op-
tometrists per 100,000 population. The latter figure is taken from the 1968 Na-
tional Vision and Eye Care Manpower Survey of the National Center for Health
Statistics (HEW 1973h). The average output figure is derived from the 1964
American Optometric Association (AOA) Survey of Optometrists. in that sur-
vey, nationwide data were collected from over 4000 optometrists on the
wholesale value of their 1964 purchases of lenses, temples, and frames and on
the annual number of visual examinations provided. These output measures
were converted into a single output index by deflating the wholesale vai'e of
eyeglasses to physical units and then combining the number of eyeglasses and
eye examinations provided into a single measure by using the respective prices
as weights.
The 1964 average output of optometrists by state was determined by
averaging the output indexes of optometrists who responded to the AOA sur-
vey. (States in which fewer than forty optometristsresponded to the survey
were excluded from the data base. Thirty-two states hadforty or more respon-
dents.) The average output figures were then multiplied by thenumber of
practicing optometrists per 100,000 population in 1968 in order to compute
the quantity measure of the consumption of optometric services per100,000
population for each of the thirty-two states.
Data sources for the remaining variables included in themodel are presented
as each equation is discussed in detail.
[31EQUATION SPECIFICATIONS
[3.11The Demand for Optometric Services
A well-specified demand equation includes product price,income of potential
consumers, prices of substitutes, and complementsand taste variables. Equa-
tion 1 falls somewhat short of this ideal. The pricevariable was derived from
the 1964 AOA survey of optometrists. It was computedfor each state by tak-
ing a weighted average of the gross annual incomeper unit of outputof the
Optometric Services 305responding optometrists, where the weight was the siumber of units ofOutput
produced.
The prices of the competing eye care services offered by ophthalmologists
and opticians could not be included in the demand equation because thedata
were not available. However, some idea of the substitutability of theservices
of competing eye professionals foi those of the optometristmay be gained by
entering the number of ophthalmalogists and opticians per 100,000population
into the demand equation.
A dummy variable, which equals 1.0 for those states that didnot restrict the
advertising of optometric services, was included in the demandequation. Ad-
vertising would be expected to reduce the costs of theseservices to con-
sumers. Search costs are reduced because the price and terms of saleas well as
information on the supplier's identity, location, and reliabilityare often pro-
vided. Benham (1972) has shown that advertising also lowersthe price paid by
consumers for eyeglasses because itstiniulates price competitionamong
sellers. When price is held constant, the effect of advertisingwould be to shift
the demand curve for optometric services to the rightbecause the information
costs faced by consumers would be lowered andoptometrists might be able
to compete more effectively with ophthalmologists forpatients seeking eye
examinations and corrective lenses. As a condition of theirlicense, ophthalmol-
ogists, like all other physicians, cannot advertise.
To determine which states didnot restrict advertising,I used Benham's
classification of states accordingto their restrictions on the advertisingof eye-
glasses. Beriham constructed theseries by examining state laws,interviewing
optometrists and members of stateoptometry boards, and searchingnews-
papers for eyeglass advertisements.
Several socioeconomic variableshave been included in thedemand equa-
tion. The age distributionvariablepercent of the populationsixty-five and
overwas included iii the demand relationbecause the need for and utiliza-
tion of corrective lensesincreases dramatically withage: about 90 percent of
adults have eyeglasses byage sixty. Consequently, the olderthe population the optometristserves, the greater should be the demandfor his services.
Percent nonwhitewas included as an independentvariable because of evi- dence that blacks havestronger vision than whites.For example, at age fifty, about 90 percent of blackmen have uncorrected distancevision of 20/30 or better as comparedto less than 75 percent of thewhite men of thesame age (National Center 1963).The race variable isentered into the demand equation to test whether interstatedifferences in racialcomposition actually translate into differences in thedemand foroptometric services.
Income and educationmay also play a role in determiningthe demand for
optometric services. Use ofcorrective lenses is positivelycorrelated with family income and level ofeducation of the familyhead. Fifty percent of thepopula- tion in families withincome over $5 000 hadcorrective lenses in 1965-1966, as
0
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compared to 44 percent in families with income below$5,000. Fifty-fourper-
cent of the population in families whose head had thirteenor more years of
education owned corrective lenses in 1965-1966; thecorresponding figure for
families whose head had loss than thirteen years of schoolingwas 46 percent
(National Center 1967; the figures are age adjusted).Itis not evident from
these figures whether the income effect results from thehigher educational
evels associated with higher-income individuals,or whether the educational
effect actually reflects a positive income elasticity forcorrective lenses. To
determine the separate effects of income and educationOfl the demand for
optometric services, state per capita income and thepercent of the state
population with one to three years of collegewere included in the demand
equation.
Although use of corrective lenses increases with incomeand education, it is
not clear a priori that the partial effects of each factoron the demand for op-
tometric services will be positive. The reason is that the higherthe income and
education of individuals, the more likely theyare to use the services of an
ophthalmologist instead of an optometrist to obtainan optical prescription.
Twenty-five percent of those individuals with family incomeunder $5,000
who had an eye examination and purchased eyeglasses during thetwo years
preceding July 1965-June 1966 obtained their optical prescription froman
ophthalmologist; the corresponding figure for those with family incomeof
$5,000 and over was 36 percent. Similarly, 28 percent of individualsin families
whose head had twelve years of schoolingor less obtained their optical
prescription from an ophthalmologist; the corresponding figure in families
whose head had at least thirteen years of schoolingwas 48 percent (National
Center 1967).
All the socioeconomic variables were coltected from the 1970census.
[3.2]The Supply of Optometric Services
The determinants of the supply of optometric services were examined by
estimating two equations, one for location and one for average workload.
The Location of OptometristsPrice was included in the location equation
and was expected to be positively associated with the number of optometrists
per 100,000 population. With price held constant, the per capita income varia-
ble in the location equation must be interpreted as a proxy for those cultural,
educational, and other environmental advantages of a state that are correlated
with per capita income.
The number of 1968 graduating students in optometry schools was entered
into the equation to test whether graduating optometrists have a propensity to
remain in the state whE.re they receive their professional education. One
reason this should be the case is that optometry schools would seem more
likely to draw entering students from theirown states than from otherplaces,Douglas (oate
since home-state students are often given preferential treatment When they
arply for admission and often face lower tuition costs.
A national hoard dummy variable was included in the location equationas a
proxy for the stringency of state licensing requirements. This variableequals
1.0 for those states that did not accept the national board examinationsin
1968. Nationwide, the national hoard examination was accepted in lieu ofthe
written portion of the state examination in twenty-six states in 1968.6The
failure rates on individual state licensing examinations would bea more ap-
propriate barrier-to-entry variable, but such data are not available. Implicitin
the use of the national board dummy is the assumption that thosestates which
do not accept the national board examinations also have themore strihgent
licensing requirements.
There is evidence that the licensing arrangements of someprofessions have
been used to restrict labor mobility between states. Holen (1965,p. 494) found
that interstate mobility in law and dentistrywas low relative to medicine
because of the "structure of licensing arrangements. . .and because of theex-
clusionary practices of various state licensing boards." Shefound that failure
rates among candidates for license tended to be high instates where lawyers
or dentists enjoyed high incomes. This was not true in thecase of physicians;
restrictions on their interstate mobility are few because ofreciprocity agree-
ments and the use of national boards. Maurizi (1974) haspresented regression
results that support the hypothesis thatstate licensing boards adjust thepass
rate on licensing examinations in order toprotect the incomes of those already
licensed.
The Work-loads of OptometristsPrice is the only variable in the workload
equation. Optometrists are expected to takeon greater workloads the higher
their per unit reward for doingso, unless their supply curves are backward
bending and the averageoptometrist operates on the negatively slopedpor-
tion.
[4]EMPIRICAL RESULTS
[4.1]The Demand for OptometricServices
The second-stageestimates of the demandequations are presented in Ta-
bie1. All variablesare in natural logs except for theadvertising dummy. The
per capita income coefficients(elasticities) vary from 0.34to 0.59 in the de-
mand equations. Thisrange is high relative to the incomeelasticities of de
mand estimated for physicianservices by Fuchs and Kramer.H A relativelyhigh-






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)good portion of optometric services,such as tinted glasses, more expensive
stylish frames, and extra glasses, would seem tofall into the luxury category. In
fact, the income elasticity of eye health servicescould be substantially greater
than 0.5. The income elasticity ofdemand for optometric services would un-
derstate the income elasticity for eye health servicesif the tendency to secure
optical prescriptions and corrective lenses from ophthalmologists and opticians
rather than optometrists increased with income.9
The interpretation of the coefficients of the advertising dummy and the
education and price variables is hazardous because of multicoltinearity. The ad-
vertising dummy varies markedly in the estimated demand equations. In
regression 4, with the price variable excluded, the advertising dummy coeffi-
cient is significant in a one-tailed test at the 3 percent level and indicates that
the demand for optometric services is 13 percent greater in those states where
advertising is not restricted. However, with price included in the demand equa-
tion the t values of the advertising dummy (all to below 1 .0.
The education variable is positively related to the quantity of optometric
services demanded and approaches statistical significance in equation 1, where
the advertising dummy does not appear. In regressions 2 and 4, education is in-
cluded with the advertising dummy and is statistically insignificant. An insignifi-
cant education coefficient would lend support to the hypothesis that the ten-
dency to turn to ophthalmologists and opticians rather than optometrists for
optical prescriptions and corrective lenses increases with education. The hy-
pothesis itself seems reasonable: as education increases, so does emphasis on
good health and, probably, interestri reading, for which corrective lenses are
usually required by middle age.
The price coefficient varies from 0.48 to 1.54 in regressions 1, 2, and 3
but becomes positive in regressions 5 and 6 when the education and advertis-
ing variables are excluded from the estimated demand equations.
The coefficients and statistical significance of the race andage variables re-
main fairly stable in the estimated regression equations. The positive associ-
ation between the demand for optometric services and the percent of the
population 65 and over is an expected result, given the increaseduse of cor-
rective lenses with age. The age elasticity is approximately 0.5. Percentnon-
white is negatively related to demand for optometricservices. The negative as-
sociation can be explained in part by the better vision of blacks. Perhapsan
equally important explanation, however, is that blacksprobably have higher
transportation and search costs than whites. Many blacks livein urban ghettos
or rural areas in the South where optometriccare is relatively scarce.
As anticipated in section 3.1, theregression results provide no decisive evi-
dence on the extent to which theservices of ophthalmologists and opticians
are substituted for those of the optometrist. Theoptician variable is highly sig-
nificant and negatively relatedto the demand for optometric services when
/
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theophthalmologist variable does not appear in the demand equation. When
the variablesfor the two competing eye professionals are entered together,
however, theoptician variable is significant at only the 30 percent confidence
eve'. Theophthalmologist variable is always statistically insignificant even
when the opticianvariable is excluded from the demand models)0
The "better performance"of the optician variable may indicate that opti-
cians offer servicesthat are more competitive with those of optometrists than
do ophthalmologistsThis interpretation is consistent with the fact that dis-
pensing eyeglasses is thechief service provided by optometrists. According to
the output measureused in this study, the dispensing of corrective lenses con-
stitutes 76 percent ofoptometric output, and visual exams account for the re-
niaining 24 percent.11 Thecoefficient of the optician variable is stable at about
-0.20 in all the estimateddemand equations.
[4.21The Location of Optometrists
The second-stage estimates ofthe location equation are
Opto6.44 + 1.01P + 0.58Y+ 0.002C.rads -0.15 License
(1.86)tl.51) (1.86) (1.61) (1.71)
All variables are in natural logs except thenumber of graduating optometry
students and the national board dummy.The t statistics are in parentheses.
The national board dummy coefficientindicates that state licensing ex-
aminations are an effective meansof restricting entry, given theassumption
that states which do not accept thenational boards in optometryhave the
more stringent licensing requirements.The dummy coefficientindicates that in
those states with more restrictive licensingrequirements the per capitastock
of optometrists has been constrained to alevel 15 percent lower than instates
not so classified.
The graduating optometry student coefficientshows that optometristshave
at least a slight propensity to remain inthe state where theyreceive their pro-
fessional education. The elasticity of Optowith respect to Gradsinherent in
the regression results is very low, approximately0.03. A low elasticityis to be
expected because only nine states haveoptometry schools inthe United
States. Therefore, a significant numberof optometrists mustestablish their
practice in a state other than the onewhere they receivedtheir professional
training, or optometrists would be muchless evenlydistributed around the
country than they actually are. The elasticitymust also be lowbecause in any
one year the total number of optometricgraduates is small inrelation to the
number of optometrists already in practice.
The attraction of optometrists to stateswith high per capitaincome, holding
price constant, indicates that asignificant role intheir locationaldecision isplayed by environmental factors that are correlated with per capita
income
this tinding and the role of price in the locational decision are discussedbeIo',
[4.31The Workload of Optometrists
The second-stage estimates of the workload equation are
In Work= 3.22 1.05 InP
(2.15)(-3.43)
Thestatistics are in parentheses. The obvious explanation of thenegative
price coefficient is that optometrists are on the backward-bending portionof a
labor supply curve. Taken together, the negative unitary elasticity ofworkload
with respect to price and the positive unitary (!Iasticity of theper capita num-
ber of optometrists with respect to price imply that the in-statesupply of op-
tometric services is not sensitive to variation in price.
[5]Implications of (he Research
The uneven distribution of primary health professionalsin the United States
between urban and rural areas has beena source of concern to healthecono-
mists for the past decade.12 In 1971, for example, themean number of physi-
cians per 100,000 population was 93.5 in ruralstates, and 125.8 in urban
ones.13 Optometrists, like physicians,are more heavily concentrated in urban
areas: 9.7 active optometrists per 100,000 in urban statesas compared to 7.8
in rural ones. A similar disparity betweenurban and rural states existsin
ophthalmological manpower. Thereare 4.8 active ophthalmologistsper
100,000 population in urbanstates and 3.6 per 100,000 in ruralones. Opticians
are also concentrated in urban states, with 7.0active practitioners per 100,000
population and 4.2 per 100,000 in ruralones (HEW 1972, HEW 1973a)
The estirnat;on of the marketmodel for optometric servicesin this study
provides some insight into thereasons for the uneven distribution of health
manpower. Estimation of the locationequation (subsection 4.2) revealed that
price, per capita income, andthe stringency of state licensingrequirements
were the most important determinantsof the location of optometrists. In the
following tabulation, themeans of these variables are presented forthe urban
and rural states includedin the cross section;as before, states classified as ur-
ban have 55percent or more of their populationin urban areas:
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TaKen together,the regression results and the data shown indicate that differ-
ences in the priceof output and in the environmental and cultural qualities ofa
state that correlatewith per capita income are the chief reasons for the uneven
distribUtion of optometric manpower between urban and rural states. Differ-
ences in the stringencyof state licensing requirements, as represented by the
national board dummy. work in favor of rural states in terms of the location of
optometric manpower.
The mean number of optometrists per 100.000 population in the nineteen
urban states is 9.71. This is 1 5 percent more than the mean number in the thir-
teen rural states (8.45 per 100,000). The price coefficient in the estimated loca-
tion equation indicates that if the price of output in rural states increased to
the urban state mean, or by 5.5 percent, the mean number of optometrists per
100,000 would increase by the same percent. The price effect, therefore, does
not account for the major portion of the discrepancy in the per capita number
of optometrists between urban and rural states. However, the per capita in-
come coefficient in the location equation suggests that the 25 percenthigher
income level in urban states attracted 1 5 percent more optometrists than
would have been the case if the income levels of rural and urban states were
the same. Apparently, then, the explanation for the uneven distribution of op-
tometrists lies in "life style" differences between the two types of areain the
environmental and cultural attributes of a state that are correlated with per
capita income.
The same effect could be very important in explaining the urban-rural
discrepancy in the location of physicians. The per capita income coefficients in
the physician location equation estimated by Fuchs and Kramer (1973, p. 31
were as high as 0.5 and were statistically significantwith price also included as
one of the other independent variables. The stock ofphysicians in urban states
is 34 percent greater than in rural ones. More than one-thirdof this urban-rural
difference can be accounted for by differences in life-style opportunities,given
the per capita income differential of about 25 percent and assumingthat the
upper range of Fuchs and Kramer's estimated per capitaincome coefficients in
their location equation are relevant.
The relative scarcity of optometrists in rural areas does nottranslate unim-
peded into a similar differential in the supply of optometricservices. The esti-
mated price coefficient in the workload equation showedthat services offered
by the average optometrist declined in response to increases inprice. As indi-
cated in the tabulation above, the price of optometricservices in urban states
is 5.5 percent higher than in rural states. According tothe price coefficient in
the workload equation, average workloads in urban statesshould correspond-
ingly be about 5.5 percent less. About one-third of thedifferential in per capita
Optometric manpower between urban andrural states appears to be ac-
counted for, in terms of the total supply ofoptometric services, byhigher
workloacls taken on by rural optometrists becauseof lower market prices.
313The same argument could also he relevant to the supply ofphysician ser-
vices in urban and rural areas. Regression results have been presented by
Fuchs
and Kramer (1973) and by Feldstein (1970) which support thehypothesis that
physicians reduce their supply in response to an increase in fees*'[his may be
a partial explanation of why residents of rural areas are not in relativelypoorer
health than urbanites. The relative scarcity in the supply of physicianservices in
rural areas may not be nearly as great as the relative scarcityof physicians
NOTES
In 1969, expenditures on optometric services totaled about $800miiilhan.his ishe most
recent year for which a reliable estimate can be made (Coate 1977
This model is very similar to the market model for physicianservices estimated in luc hs and
Kramer 1973).
This procedure is described thoroughly in Coate article4, below)
Near vision generally deteriorates quite rapidly alterage thirty-five, with 90 percent of
adults between the ages of forty-live and fifty-four havingvisual acuity of less than 1414
(National Center 1963). The same pattern holdstrue for distance vision, although thrate of
deterioration with age is not as great.
The data souce for the number of graduatesfrom individual optonietry schoolsis Pennel and Delong (1970).
This information was collected frontunpublished data of the Optometric Centerof New York.
The regressions are unweighted. Plots of theresiduals did not indicate heteroscedasticits.
8,The income elasticities in what Fuchsand Kramer 1973,p. 33) call their more successful
estimates of the demand for physicianservices range from 004 to 0 20
One problem with this interpretationthat is relevant to all the regressionsexcept 3 is that either the number of ophthalmologistsor of opticians or both are being controlledfor Within the constrants of thesemodels, therefore increases in'ncome could result in a
movement by consumers from optometrists
to ophthalmologists or opticians only ifthe lat- ter increased their workloads. Inregression 3 the numbers ofophthalmologists and op-
tometrists are allowed to vary, and thisqualification does not applv
When the ophthalmologist variableis included in the demand equation svithoutthe opti- cian variable, the coefficientis negative, but thestatistic is less than 1 0 in absolute value)
These results are not presentedin Table I.
11The mean number of visualexams supplied by optometrists bystate averaged 1.063 The mean number of eyeglasses provided bystate in visual exam units averaged3,310 ft should not be assumed, however, thai
i)phthalmologists supply only medicalservices and do not dispense corrective lenses.About 22 percent ofpracticing ophthalmologists employ opti. cians or optical fitters (HEW l973a).
12.See, for example. Fein (1967,
pp. 74-75. More recently Lave et al (1975,p 22) conduded 'A major unresolved problemis the provision of lphysicianjservices to rural areas distant from major cities" Yettand Sloan 11974,p 1251 also argue that "physicians,lre in noticea- bly short supply in loss-incomedistricts and rural areasin general" 13States classified as urban have55 Percent or more at theirpc)F)ulaton in urban areas In computing the urban and ruralstate means the stateper capita number of physicians was
314 l)ouglas ('oater
c Services tri
weighted by the statepopulation. The 1971 per caprta number of physicians by state was
taken from AMA(1973).
iper capita incomecoefficientsiithe- kemon equations of Fuchs and Kramer 197 (,
p 31)were generallyunstable because of multicolhnarity.
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